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 Did Kettlewell commit fraud? Re-examining the
evidence
David Wy¨ss Rudge
H.B.D. Kettlewell is famous for several investigations conducted in the early
1950s on the phenomenon of industrial melanism, which are widely regarded
as the classic demonstration of natural selection. In a recent (2002) book-
length popularization of this episode in the history of the science, science
writer Judith Hooper draws attention to what she interprets as discrepancies
in the results reported by Kettlewell in his first scientific papers on the
subject. On the basis of correspondence among Kettlewell and his associates,
a survey of scientific publications that mention outstanding questions sur-
rounding the phenomenon, as well as interviews with his son, surviving
colleagues, and scientists who have worked on industrial melanism, Hooper
all but explicitly concludes that Kettlewell committed fraud. The following
essay critically examines her evidence in support of this allegation, including
her discussion of his character, the alleged motives, and whether fraud was
even committed. None of Hooper’s arguments is found to withstand careful
scrutiny. The concluding section draws several conclusions about how
history of science should be depicted to the public.
1. Introduction
Bernard (H.B.D.) Kettlewell is famous for several investigations he conducted in the early
1950s on the phenomenon of industrial melanism, the rapid rise in frequency of dark forms
of many moth species in the vicinity of manufacturing centers shortly after the industrial
revolution, as an apparent consequence of the first large-scale air pollution. It was first
discovered in the peppered moth, Biston betularia, and is now thought to have occurred in
at least 100 other species in Britain alone (Kettlewell, 1973; Majerus, 1998).
Kettlewell is widely regarded as the first researcher to establish that dark forms became
more common in these areas owing to differential predation by birds. He pointed out that in
forests downwind of manufacturing centers, air pollution darkened the resting sites of moths
by killing off the normal pale lichen cover and blanketing trees with soot. In such a soot-
darkened environment, predators that search for the moths primarily by relying on visual
clues would have considerable difficulty spotting dark moths, but would presumably have no
such difficulty locating pale moths, which are quite conspicuous against soot-darkened
backgrounds. The goal of his first experiment in 1953 was to establish that birds prey upon
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the moth and further that they have the same difficulty spotting dark moths when they rest
on soot-darkened tree trunks humans do (Kettlewell, 1955b). The investigation proceeded in
three steps. First, Kettlewell developed a procedure to gauge how conspicuous the two forms
of the moth are when they rest on pale lichen-covered and soot-darkened backgrounds.
Second, he conducted a preliminary experiment using captive birds to determine whether
birds eat moths at all, and, if so, whether predation results in a relatively greater loss of the
more conspicuous form. Third, in his most celebrated experiments, he released marked
examples of pale and dark moths into a polluted setting and attempted to recapture as many
as possible using a combination of mercury vapor light and assembling traps. The logic
behind this experiment was that if a higher recapture rate for one form was found, it was
evidence that the form was at an advantage in that environment. Kettlewell found that, in the
polluted environment, the recapture rate of the dark form was twice as high as that for the
light form. By ruling out other possible explanations, as well as by directly observing birds
eating moths in the manner predicted, he concluded that the dark forms were at a selective
advantage in the polluted environment, owing to differential predation by birds. A
companion experiment conducted in 1955 in an unpolluted environment demonstrated the
reverse (Kettlewell, 1956). In unpolluted woods, the lichen cover associated with trees
constitutes a pale background against which the pale form of the moth is difficult to
distinguish, but the dark forms are much easier to spot. Using a similar mark–release–
recapture experiment, Kettlewell documented that, in this environment, the recapture rate for
the pale form was higher. Kettlewell is widely regarded as having clinched the case that this
difference in recapture rate was due to differential predation by having an associate, Niko
Tinbergen, film the more conspicuous form of the moth being preyed upon first by birds in
both settings.
As one might imagine, the actual story of Kettlewell’s work on industrial melanism is
more complicated than the above paragraph suggests. Over the past 50 years, researchers on
the phenomenon have drawn attention to three fundamental problems in the way
Kettlewell’s initial studies were conducted and interpreted, which are summarized in
Majerus (1998). First, Kettlewell chose to introduce large numbers of moths in excess of the
endemic population so as to ensure that the results would be statistically significant, which
raises the possibility that his results were simply an artifact of the elevated densities of
moths used. Second, Kettlewell released moths on the assumption that they spend most of
the day in plain sight on the trunks of trees; however, in fact, the actual resting location is
not well known and there is some evidence that they may rest higher up in the canopy.
Third, Kettlewell’s investigations apparently relied on a combination of both laboratory-bred
and “wild caught” insects, which opens up the possibility that differences in the recapture
rate might reflect differences in survivorship between these two variants. Despite these
problems, review articles have repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that multiple investiga-
tions by subsequent researchers support the basic outlines of Kettlewell’s explanation
(Berry, 1990; Grant, 1999; Cook, 2000, 2003). Perhaps the most striking line of evidence in
its favor, however, has been studies since the advent of Clean Air Legislation in both Britain
and the United States that document that the predicted decline of the dark form has indeed
occurred (Grant et al., 1996). While several problems still remain (as is the case in any
active area of scientific investigation), among virtually all scientists who work on the
phenomenon there is no question that industrial melanism is an example of natural selection
and that bird predation is the major—but not the only—selective factor at work (Grant,
1999; Cook, 2003).
It is striking that, despite our current scientific understanding that the phenomenon is
more complex than initially recognized by Kettlewell, industrial melanism has had a very
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different fate among the lay public and the popular press. Since the early 1960s, it became
the example of choice for illustrating natural selection both in textbooks and in the popular
media. Part of its ubiquity rests in several pedagogic advantages associated with this
particular example, including the relative simplicity of the phenomenon, the familiarity most
introductory students can be expected to have with its major elements (birds, moths,
pollution and predation), and its conduciveness to visual representation (Rudge, 2000,
2003). At least part of its fame lies in the adroit way that Kettlewell and other members of
the group he worked with at Oxford publicized this particular example in order to promote
the teaching of evolution and to secure funding for their research endeavors.
Consideration of these other factors suggests there might be another heretofore-untold
story surrounding Kettlewell’s work. In a recent popularization of this episode in the history
of science, science writer Judith Hooper uncovers what she regards as a series of mysteries
surrounding both the phenomenon of industrial melanism and Kettlewell’s work upon it
(Hooper, 2002). Her analysis draws great attention to: (1) the fact that summaries of the
phenomenon grossly oversimplify a complex episode in science; (2) the existence of
outstanding questions and interpretive problems associated with nearly every aspect of the
phenomenon; and, in particular, (3) an apparent discrepancy in the results Kettlewell
reported in his 1955 and 1956 papers. On the basis of these considerations, Hooper raises the
possibility that Kettlewell committed fraud and that his colleagues at Oxford—most notably
E.B. (Henry) Ford—were complicit (at least to the extent that they actively tried to suppress
evidence that might have led people to question the standard account). A careful review of
Hooper’s arguments demonstrates that they rest upon an obvious agenda, poor historical
scholarship, mistakes in scientific reasoning, and several fundamental misunderstandings
about the nature of science and evolutionary biology.
2. Critique of Hooper’s “argument”1
Fraud in the context of science refers to the misrepresentation of data. It ranges from the
deliberate manufacturing of data and/or altering of experimental results to the fudging of
data and only reporting good results (Martin, 1992). While socially defined, and therefore
subject to change, it is not a charge that should be bandied about lightly in the context of
popularizations, particularly in the absence of careful research to substantiate that fraud has
indeed occurred. As Hooper herself recognizes, allegations of fraud are among the most
serious in science.2
While Hooper does not explicitly charge Kettlewell with fraud, there can be no doubt
that this is the intended interpretation she wishes the reader to draw from her book, as she
writes:
When the Nobelist Sir Peter Medawar famously declared: “The scientific paper is a
fraud,” he was referring to the fact that science doesn’t always proceed according to
Popper’s ideal of the hypothetico-deductive method, but he may also have been
thinking of human factors (ambition, jealousy, rush to publication, megalomania,
behind the scenes maneuverings, even sex, illness and desperation) that are sanitized out
of journals. Underlying the traditional science paper – as Karl Sabbagh observes in A
Rum Affair, the tale of Heslop-Harrison – “are several layers of unreported facts – facts
that could never be reported without legal advice – about U’s incompetence, V’s
marriage break-up, W’s burning desire to win a Nobel prize, X’s dislike of experiment,
Y’s irrational belief in a particular theory against all evidence, Z’s need to please his or
her boss.”3 We could fill in the blanks: Bernard’s desperate need to please E. B. Ford,
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Ford’s fanatical belief in the power of adaptation, everybody’s craving for merit badges
(an FRS for Bernard, a knighthood for Henry perhaps). Then there were Bernard’s
family problems, his insecure finances, his craving for recognition at Oxford, the
“turns” he suffered during his experiment, his exhaustion, sleep deprivation and mood
swings, even the emotional aridity of his childhood. We might add Henry’s desire for
revenge on his enemies, his idolatry of Sir Ronald Fisher, the intrigues and turf wars
within the zoology department at Oxford, his investment in his experiments with
Maniola jurtina and Panaxia, his grandiosity, even his discomfort with females.
Traditionally, these human factors are deemed irrelevant to the scientific process, as if
scientists were a race of hard-wired robots. (Hooper, 2002: 298–9)4
The “argument” Hooper provides for this charge, alluded to in the above paragraph, extends
throughout her entire book. Her approach constitutes a three-pronged attack, aimed at
establishing (1) that Kettlewell was of such a character that he was indeed capable of
committing fraud, (2) that he had a pressing motive to do so, and further (3) that an apparent
discrepancy in results presented in his published reports is evidence that Kettlewell “fudged”
his data. In the following subsections, I will evaluate her arguments for each of these
claims.
A question of character
Much of Hooper’s book is devoted to sharing a series of mostly previously published stories
about the colorful members of what has come to be known as Ford’s “Oxford School of
Ecological Genetics” (cf. Turner, 1985).5 One can hardly fault her in the context of a
biography for sharing some of the details of their personal lives, as this is necessary to
humanize the story and to clarify some of the interactions among her protagonists. However,
given the enormous amount of space devoted to this end, one cannot help but wonder
whether the extended discussions of the personalities, characters and private lives of the
protagonists are intended as evidence for the serious charges Hooper has leveled against
them. The answer is resoundingly clear from the following passage:
The roots of the peppered moth story lie deep in the personal histories of a small
number of scientists, preserved in the memories of friends, colleagues and family, as
well as in letters bound in satin ribbons at the New Bodleian Library at Oxford. At the
very moment that the peppered moth experiments were establishing the Oxford
biologists as masters of their world, their personal and professional relationships were
disintegrating in a miasma of recriminations, intrigue, jealousy, back-stabbing, and
shattered dreams. They conceived the evidence that would carry the vital intellectual
argument, but at its core lay flawed science, dubious methodology, and wishful
thinking. Clustered around the peppered moth is a swarm of human ambitions and self-
delusions, shared among some of the most renowned evolutionary biologists of our era.
(Hooper 2002: xix–xx)
Nearly half of Hooper’s book is devoted to establishing that Kettlewell, Ford, and others
associated with work on the peppered moth were of such a character that they would commit
fraud and conspire to hide the details.6
It is striking, in light of how much space is devoted to this end, that, for many of the
personal details Hooper chooses to discuss at length, the connection to the charges of fraud
and conspiracy are never explicitly made. For instance, Hooper draws great attention to the
fact that Ford had a reputation as a misogynist (pp. 54, 56, 58–61, 229–30). It is certainly
plausible that this might have affected the conduct of research at Oxford. However, all of the
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principal scientists in this story are men. The one prominent female scientist associated with
this group, Dr. Miriam Rothschild, found Ford to be “exceedingly kind and understanding”
(Clarke, 1995: 152). Hooper even admits that he was “typically gracious,” “courtly” and
“grateful” towards his secretaries (p. 101). While it is true that he was at times incredibly
rude to female students and the wives of graduate students, it is fairly clear he was rude on
occasion to everyone (Clarke, 1995: 153). Yet, what, if anything, does the fact a person is a
misogynist (or more accurately, has a reputation as a misogynist) have to do with whether
that person would commit fraud and/or conspiracy? Similarly, one can question Hooper’s
decision to discuss many details of Kettlewell’s private life, including his reputation as a
philanderer, the sordid details surrounding his daughter’s death, and his apparent suicide. If
Hooper sincerely believes these details are evidence that Ford and Kettlewell would commit
fraud or conspiracy, it is simply an argument ad hominem. If, however, in contrast to what
the lengthy quotation above implies, they are not intended as evidence in favor of the book’s
theses, it is hard not to interpret her decision to discuss these details at length as simply an
inflammatory attempt to titillate the reader.
That being said, there are some details Hooper chooses to share about Kettlewell’s
professional life that are relevant to her contention that he was capable of committing fraud.
Hooper draws attention to Kettlewell’s background choice experiments and his investiga-
tions into the build-up of dominance in the peppered moth. In both cases, it is clear that
strong theoretical convictions may have led Kettlewell astray when it came to interpreting
the results of these investigations (Majerus, 1998). Hooper’s strategy in drawing attention to
these examples is obvious—if he committed fraud in these two cases, is it not plausible that
he committed fraud during his more famous predation experiments on the phenomenon of
industrial melanism?
There are two problems with this line of reasoning. First, being wrong is not, in and of
itself, evidence that one has committed fraud. If the history of science has demonstrated
anything, it is that the eventual fate of all scientific theories is to be proven wrong. We do
not fault Darwin as a scientist for advancing a theory of inheritance (his theory of
pangenesis) simply because it was ultimately discredited. Second, it is mistaken to discredit
scientists for having convictions and sticking with them. It is, for instance, precisely because
Watson and Crick were convinced that the genetic code must be simple and elegant that they
persisted—despite several false starts—and ultimately determined the structure of DNA. It
may at times be difficult to distinguish between strong intuitions about processes that have
a basis in the world of experience from those that do not; hence the importance in science of
repeatability by other scientists. In the case of Kettlewell’s work on background choice and
his theory of the build-up of dominance, it was the inability of others to repeat his results
that ultimately discredited these two lines of investigation. With regard to the predation
experiments on industrial melanism, in contrast, numerous studies have qualitatively
confirmed the results of Kettlewell’s investigations (Berry, 1990; Cook, 2003).
Yet another line of evidence Hooper uses to establish that Kettlewell was capable of
committing fraud is to cast doubt on his abilities as a scientist. To establish this, Hooper
describes Kettlewell as “not a research scientist by training but a medical doctor” (p. xvi)
and repeatedly refers to him as an “amateur” (pp. xvi, 123, 159). While admitting his
remarkable skills as a naturalist, she also repeatedly denigrates his abilities as a scientist:
“Bernard was an extraordinarily gifted lepidopterist who was weak in genetics, statistics and
evolutionary theory” (p. 212). This characterization is decidedly unfair, if not misleading.
Ford regarded Kettlewell as “the finest living ecologist of the Lepidoptera” (Ford, 1979),
and R.J. Berry referred to him as “the best naturalist I have ever known” (Berry, 1990), both
of which contrast with Hooper’s tacit suggestion that the work he did was inferior because
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of his lack of professional training. Indeed, it was the extensive connections with over 150
amateur entomologists—which Kettlewell had cultivated for decades prior to his association
with Ford—that enabled him to conduct the extensive surveys of the distribution of melanic
forms throughout Britain, and that, in turn, were the basis for the whole betularia study.
Professional academics typically do not have the time, experience or resources for travel and
collecting that such an undertaking would involve. Describing Kettlewell as “weak in
genetics” is also particularly misleading—it completely ignores the informal training he
received over a period of at least twenty years under the tutelage of E.A. Cockayne, who,
among other things, was nominated to serve as President of the Genetical Society by J.B.S.
Haldane and seconded by Cyril Darlington.7 As a result of this collaboration, Kettlewell
published the results of several breeding and temperature experiments.
Hooper also draws great attention to published remarks by Sam (R.J.) Berry, a junior
associate, who referred to Kettlewell as “the worst professional scientist I have ever known”
and added that “[w]riting papers with him was traumatic; as an experienced clinician he
made rapid diagnoses and refused to be diverted by what he regarded as irrelevant evidence”
(Berry, 1990: 322). One must be very careful in evaluating such a comment.8 First, while
being disorganized, dogmatic and having difficulty writing papers are all indications that one
may not be the best of scientists, these comments alone are not evidence that such an
individual would commit fraud. Second, the reminiscences upon which Hooper bases her
account are primarily by those who knew Kettlewell during the last years of his life, and
they may therefore be misleading when it comes to understanding him and his motivations
at the time of the investigations. His life-long friend Eric Classey, while freely admitting
Kettlewell was not the most careful of scientists, completely denies that he was capable of
committing fraud, a perspective consistently maintained by all of the scientists who worked
with him.9
As a third line of evidence, Hooper resorts to the fact that Kettlewell was exhausted and
suffering from a variety of physical and psychological ailments at the time of his
investigations, as if this is evidence that his condition might somehow prompt him to
commit fraud and act out of character (pp. 70, 88–9, 112, 133, 180–2, 193, 206, 223–5).
Recognition of the difficult conditions he worked under at the time can just as easily be
interpreted as an indication of heroic dedication and self-sacrifice in the name of science. Do
we seriously question the merits of physicist Stephen Hawking’s work upon learning that he
has ALS (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis) or the merits of John Nash’s work when we
discover that this Nobel Laureate mathematician was diagnosed as a paranoid schizo-
phrenic? Merely being ill, tired or insecure is not sufficient evidence that one would be
willing to commit fraud.
What was Kettlewell’s alleged motive?
Casting to one side concerns about whether it has indeed been established that Kettlewell
was of such a character that he would commit fraud, what possible motives does Hooper
suggest might have led Kettlewell to “fudge” his data? Hooper identifies two motives in
particular. First, his dogmatic allegiance to a broader pan-selectionist agenda set out by Ford
and his colleagues, an agenda whose fate rested upon the success of the investigations. And,
second, related to the former, a host of personal insecurities that Kettlewell, a former
medical practitioner, had in establishing himself professionally as a researcher at Oxford.
The importance of industrial melanism to the Oxford school of ecological genetics 
In the preface to her book, Hooper sets the stage for her analysis of the motives of Ford and
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his associates by first drawing attention to the “shaky ground” on which Darwin’s theory of
natural selection rested during the first half of the twentieth century (p. xv). There are
multiple reasons that lay behind the “eclipse of Darwinism” during this period, including the
advent of numerous alternative mechanisms of evolution (Lamarckian inheritance, orthoge-
nesis) and the rediscovery of Mendelian genetics, which was initially seen as an alternative
to Darwin’s theory of natural selection (Bowler, 2003: chapter 7). Hooper rejects this
standard analysis in favor of a single cause, namely the absence of an experimental
demonstration of natural selection “apart from admittedly artificial laboratory studies of fruit
flies” (p. xv), and further on she adds that “[t]here was doubt that natural selection could
ever be experimentally demonstrated at all, and if it could not, then evolutionary biology
was doomed to be a second rate ‘historical science,’ incapable of being proved or disproved”
(pp. xv–xvi). Hence the importance of the phenomenon of industrial melanism, and, in
particular, Kettlewell’s experimental demonstration.
The problem with this analysis is three-fold. First, Kettlewell’s investigations took place
well after the period of time that historians of biology refer to as the “evolutionary
synthesis” during the 1920s to 1940s, when evolutionary biologists are widely seen to have
reached consensus on many issues in biology, including the important role of natural
selection (Mayr and Provine, 1980). While Haldane’s (1924) calculation of the speed of the
spread of the carbonaria gene responsible for dark coloration in the peppered moth certainly
contributed to this movement in biology, it is misleading to suggest that Kettlewell’s
experiments played an important role. At most, Hooper can draw attention to the importance
of Kettlewell’s experiments in testing what was recognized to be a particularly striking
example of natural selection, and their subsequent role in what Stephen Jay Gould has
dubbed the “hardening of the synthesis” (Gould, 1983). Second, at the time of Kettlewell’s
studies in the early 1950s, there were already many experimental demonstrations of natural
selection, including field experiments (see Dobzhansky, 1951). Third, and perhaps most
alarming, is a fundamental misunderstanding about how claims are established in historical
sciences like evolutionary biology. Evolutionary biology is a historical science, because
many of the phenomena in its domain are historical, and, indeed, take place on a geologic
time scale. The extended nature of evolutionary phenomena in time often precludes
experiments that can be conducted within the span of human lifetimes.
Contrary to what Hooper (2002: 163–4) suggests, the foregoing does not imply that
“anything goes” when it comes to claims in evolutionary biology, just as the fact that there
are no eyewitnesses does not preclude a crime scene investigator from reaching reliable
conclusions about the past. Like detectives, evolutionary biologists not only infer what
might have led to the patterns they observe, but they also trace implications of these
inferences that can be the object of independent tests (e.g. experiments and observations).
There are some evolutionary phenomena that can be tracked and studied in the span of a
human lifetime, which are referred to as microevolutionary phenomena. The fact that
microevolutionary processes can be studied experimentally while macroevolutionary pro-
cesses cannot does not imply that claims about macroevolutionary phenomena are merely
speculations about the long-term consequences of phenomena that can be studied experi-
mentally. Nor does it lead to the conclusion that, in the absence of experimental evidence,
there is no reliable basis upon which claims about macroevolution can be tested and
supported. Darwin’s theory of common descent won the scientists of his day over in a
relatively short period of time, not because of dramatic experimental demonstrations, but
rather because of the explanatory power of his theory, its ability to unite otherwise disparate
phenomena, and its fruitfulness in opening up new areas of investigation (Kitcher, 1985).
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Many of Darwin’s claims about the history of life were eminently testable by means of
comparative observations.
Beyond all this, the slur mentioned above against the historical sciences reflects a deep-
seated misunderstanding about what it means to “prove” something in science. The
suggestion that “proof” in science only occurs in the context of experimental investigations,
i.e., only when we directly observe it under controlled circumstances, is completely
misguided for two reasons. First, experiments do not establish claims with the certitude that
Hooper and others appear to suggest. Just as historical claims are always subject to the
possibility that new evidence and/or new ways of interpreting data may lead investigators to
change their interpretation, so too are the results of experiments, as Hooper’s own review of
the literature surrounding Kettlewell’s investigations amply documents. Scientific knowl-
edge is always tentative, regardless of the method used. Second, even claims made by high-
energy physicists on the basis of the most rigorous of experiments are interpreted as holding
true for similar situations in both time and space. In other words, not only is there an
inductive step associated with the interpretation of experiments, but there is also an
inductive step associated with the extension of results to other situations. Viewed in this
way, the fact that scientists make claims about the past that can never (short of by using a
time machine) be verified by direct observation, is no different in kind than the inductive
step we associate with extending the results of an experiment on the motion of masses on the
earth to claims about what happens to masses on planets in other galaxies.
Hooper continues: “Fighting against a sea of Lamarckians, saltationists, macro-
mutationists, and ‘random drift’ believers, a resolute band of neo-Darwinians sought the
perfect example to prove their case” (p. xvi). This claim is completely mistaken with
reference to Kettlewell’s work on the phenomenon of industrial melanism. Saltationism and
macromutation are theories of macroevolution, so the phenomenon of industrial melanism
was not even relevant to these debates. Nor did the peppered moth figure prominently in
debates about random drift. Indeed, it is unclear that random drift was ever seriously
considered as an explanation for the phenomenon of industrial melanism.10 Nor (contra
Hooper, 2002: 91–6) did it figure prominently in Ford’s ongoing debates with Wright,
because their published correspondence does not even mention it. Ford’s Ecological
Genetics’ extensive discussion of drift does not address industrial melanism at all, nor does
the chapter he devotes to melanism refer to drift (Ford, 1975). The placement of the chapter
devoted to “Transient Polymorphism and Melanism” is also significant. Far from occupying
the prominent position that Hooper would have us believe, it is buried as the fourteenth of
fifteen chapters at the end of the book. Chapter one, which is devoted to defining the scope
and aims of ecological genetics with multiple examples, does not even touch on industrial
melanism.
Even with reference to Lamarckianism, a theory that was used to explain industrial
melanism by J.W. Heslop-Harrison (1927), it is far from clear that Kettlewell’s experimental
demonstration that the phenomenon could be accounted for by natural selection was indeed
the definitive blow to this theory. Hooper’s sympathetic treatment of Theodore Sargent’s
interpretation of industrial melanism aside, Lamarckian inheritance is generally regarded as
having been discredited because of the implausibility of its mechanism. Once again, part of
the problem with Hooper’s interpretation rests on a fundamental misunderstanding, this time
about debates in evolutionary biology. The debates she mentions were not an all-or-nothing
affair, but rather debates about the relative importance of these mechanisms (Beatty, 1995).
No one seriously doubted that some evolutionary phenomena, particularly adaptations,
might be accounted for by natural selection—least of all Sewall Wright (Provine, 1986).
Like so many creationist and intelligent-design theorists who have written about this
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episode before her (e.g. Wells, 2000), Hooper takes the ubiquity of the phenomenon of
industrial melanism in biology textbooks as evidence of its central importance to evolution-
ary biology (pp. 146–8, 212, 241–2). The fact that the phenomenon has achieved this status
in textbooks owing to the special pedagogic advantages of this example (in particular its
conduciveness to visual depiction) seems to have been completely lost on these writers
(Rudge, 2000, 2003). Related to this is a fundamental lack of appreciation that for reasons
such as limitations of space and their intended audiences, introductory textbook accounts
written for children will not (and should not) share the complexities of this episode in the
manner one finds in academic journal articles (Rudge, 2002). Textbooks, by their nature, can
easily be interpreted as implying that facts found within them are known with much more
certitude than is actually the case. Adult commentators such as Hooper and Wells who write
about science should know better. There is a story behind every fact in science, and the
phenomenon of industrial melanism is hardly unique in this regard.
The simple fact of the matter is that the phenomenon of industrial melanism was
nowhere near as important to the careers of Kettlewell’s associates as Hooper suggests. One
indication of this is the very limited amount of space devoted to discussing Ford and
Sheppard’s work on industrial melanism in biographical memoirs written for Fellows of the
Royal Society (C. Clarke, 1977; B. Clarke, 1995). Ford includes it only as an afterthought
among his recollections on the work he and his colleagues did, and because of its
importance to the evolutionary synthesis (Mayr and Provine, 1980: 334–42). Indeed, he does
not even mention it on an extended list of his major accomplishments in genetics, written
late in his career.11
The importance of industrial melanism for Kettlewell’s career. Kettlewell’s specific
motive to commit fraud, according to Hooper, lay in a host of insecurities surrounding his
mid-life career shift from an established general practitioner to a tenuous research appoint-
ment at Oxford University (p. 90) and a desire to please his boss, Ford (pp. 295–6). As noted
above, she emphasizes he was an “amateur,” and draws great attention to the fact that
Kettlewell did not have “an advanced degree” (p. 123), disparaging his previous medical
training (M.A., M.B., B.Chir. 1933; M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P. 1934). This characterization loses
sight of the fact that much of the funding Ford and his associates received from the Nuffield
Foundation stemmed from their ability to spell out the connection of their work to issues of
medical importance and how very much strengthened that case was when a doctor by
training became affiliated with Ford’s unit.12 While the fact that Kettlewell did not have a
Ph.D. probably did undermine his stature among junior colleagues later in his career (he
received his D.Sc. in 1975), it is important to note that Ford never received a doctoral
degree;13 moreover, the necessity of having one at Oxford is a relatively recent phenomenon
(Morrell, 1997). Hooper also depicts Kettlewell as an outsider (pp. 130–1) and a man
without a college (p. 185), ignoring his affiliation with Brasenose College (a sister college of
Caius College at Cambridge, where Kettlewell trained as an undergraduate), which was
established shortly after his appointment at Oxford.14
This being said, there is no doubt that Kettlewell probably felt insecure when he first
became affiliated with Ford’s sub-department, surrounded by such luminaries as E.B. Ford,
Philip Sheppard, and A.J. Cain, each of whom set high standards for themselves and
expected the same in others. Indeed, when one considers how Kettlewell parleyed his
investigations on the phenomenon of industrial melanism into a career and their subsequent
reception by his colleagues, scientists in general and the lay public, his motive for
committing fraud seems transparent. The problem with this line of reasoning is that, at the
time of his investigations, none of these factors would have been obvious to Kettlewell. It is
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easy, in view of their subsequent fame, to forget the fact that in the early 1950s Kettlewell
pursued multiple lines of inquiry, some of which had nothing to do with industrial
melanism. A list of work that was begun in September 1951 prominently features five lines
of work he was doing that were related to industrial melanism, but it also mentions that he
was conducting breeding experiments on a stock of Pieris napi as well as using radioactive
isotopes to track lepidopteran and locust populations.15
Although she does not discuss it at length, Kettlewell’s radioactive tracer work is
particularly revealing with respect to Hooper’s thesis. His initial work in the early 1950s
documented that radioactive isotopes had enormous potential when it came to tracking
populations of Lepidoptera (Kettlewell, 1952). This attracted the attention of Boris P.
Uvarov, Director of the Anti-Locust Research Centre based at the British Museum (Natural
History), who subsequently provided funding for Kettlewell to pursue a similar line of
research in order to assess the potential of the method for tracking locust migrations in South
Africa.16 This research attracted media attention (Walling, 1953),17 and it is hardly a stretch
to conclude further that if it had been successful, it would have led to additional funding.
Indeed, in early February 1954, during his negotiations with Ford about whether to return to
Oxford, Kettlewell suggested he would turn over his work on industrial melanism to Ford in
favor of continuing his work on locusts.18 As he could not return to England for tax reasons,
Kettlewell was financially dependent upon the Anti-Locust Research Centre. He had every
reason to believe that, as a pioneer of this new technique, his future might lie with
radioactive isotope markers, rather than with industrial melanism. These are all the sorts of
motives Hooper implies should have led Kettlewell to commit fraud during his radioactive
tracer work. Yet, he did not; in fact, he went out of his way when publishing his results on
the locust work to draw attention to the fact that the use of radioactive isotopes had “no
advantage” over Ford’s previous technique of using cellulose paint (Kettlewell, 1955a).
In any event, establishing that Kettlewell had a motive is not sufficient to establish that
he committed fraud, any more than establishing motive—in the absence of foul play (let
alone a body)—would be sufficient to charge someone with murder. Of course, scientists
want their investigations to succeed, but this consideration in and of itself most certainly
does not imply that every time a scientist is successful, the results of his/her investigations
should be immediately suspect.
Was fraud even committed?
Members of the scientific community have long acknowledged problems associated with the
assumptions and conduct of Kettlewell’s investigations (Majerus, 1998). Yet, among the
many scientists who have worked on this phenomenon over the past 50 years, neither
Kettlewell’s colleagues, nor his severest critics, nor researchers since have ever alleged that
he committed fraud; nor has any historian of biology. In this light, it is quite surprising how
little space Hooper devotes to establishing that fraud has indeed been committed. Her
argument rests primarily on five lines of evidence, which are themselves characteristic of the
reasoning that runs through her account.
First, she draws attention to the fact that Kettlewell’s field notes have never been found,
and she quotes Dr. Bruce Grant who commented that this is “very peculiar” (p. 296). After
drawing attention to the fact that Ford regularly destroyed his correspondence and research
material and that his decision to do so might have been motivated out of a desire to cover up
fraudulent results (pp. 234–5), Hooper clearly implies that a similar line of reasoning may
have led Kettlewell to destroy his papers as well. Even a brief visit to the Kettlewell archive
will convince one that Kettlewell did not regularly destroy his correspondence; virtually
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every bit of his professional correspondence, including several letters that are less than
flattering, have been preserved. While it is true that his field notes have never been found,
there is no reason to assume that Kettlewell himself was responsible for their disappearance.
Dr. David Lees, who worked with Kettlewell, draws attention to the fact that field notes and
breeding results were often stored in the department; in other words, if they were destroyed,
Kettlewell may not even have been aware of it at the time. More to the point, if they were
available, precisely what could possibly be in them that would indicate they were indeed
fraudulent? Philip Sheppard’s field notes from similar experiments are available.19 Assum-
ing Kettlewell kept track of his results in a similar fashion, it is hard to see how, short of
evidence that low recapture rate numbers had been scratched out in favor of higher ones, this
would support Hooper’s contention that they were fraudulent at all. Or, conversely, if he had
created a nice fraudulent field notebook, why would he have destroyed it?
Second, Hooper draws great attention to what she perceives as problems surrounding
the conduct of his investigations as reported in Kettlewell (1955b). Hooper interprets the
several false starts Kettlewell reports as indicative of his willingness to tinker with his
investigation until he got the results he wanted.20 This interpretation rests, as will be shown
below, on a fundamental misunderstanding about how fieldwork in biology is carried out.
This concern aside, if Kettlewell did indeed “fudge” his data, why did he not suppress
additional details that likewise might have called his investigation into question? Hooper
suggests he simply was not savvy enough to realize the importance of doing this:
As an amateur, Bernard did not always master the idiom of science, and he frequently
betrayed himself in his papers where others would have known how to cover their
tracks. In writing up the aviary experiment, he had failed to conceal the false starts he
made before hitting on the experimental design that worked. (p. 159)
As Hooper herself acknowledges, Sheppard and Ford both carefully examined and revised
Kettlewell’s paper prior to its publication (p. 126), and thus on this line of reasoning two
scientists who are implied to be co-conspirators were equally naive. The candid nature with
which Kettlewell reports precisely what he did, the problems he encountered, and how he
attempted to resolve them all suggest that the report was brutally honest, even when the
details reflected negatively on him.
Hooper’s third and most specific line of evidence is what she interprets as a discrepancy
in the recapture rates Kettlewell reported in his 1955 and 1956 papers (p. 116). She draws
great attention to the fact that recapture frequencies dramatically rose in the middle of the
experiments (p. 254). With the assistance of Theodore Sargent, a US researcher on industrial
melanism whom Hooper describes as Kettlewell’s “nemesis” (p. 313), and Donald
Kroodsma, a biologist who has not done research on the phenomenon, Hooper concluded
that the discrepancy was real.21 After rejecting one alternative hypothesis suggested by
Michael Majerus—namely that unfavorable weather conditions might account for the
discrepancy—she concludes that Kettlewell “fudged” his data to placate his “boss,” Ford.
Hooper bases this interpretation on the fact that Kettlewell had the opportunity to hide
or alter data he did not like. Discounting multiple uses of the word “we” in his paper as
simply a scientific convention (Kettlewell, 1955b: 325, 333, 335–8), not to mention the
phrase “I and two others” that is used to describe the collection of moths from assembling
traps (Kettlewell, 1955b: 331), she suggests only his wife Hazel was present.22 In fact, there
are, numerous references among Kettlewell’s correspondence as well as his published work
that document he was accompanied “by others.”23 As noted in his 1955 paper as well as in
his correspondence,24 Kettlewell sought out and received independent confirmation of his
interpretation of scoring experiments by Dr. R.A. Hinde and Dr. H.B. Cott during his
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preliminary experiments at the Ornithological Field Station in Madingley, Cambridge. And
in a thank you letter to the Cadburys, his hosts during the original experiments, shortly after
his 1953 experiment, he writes:
We were very sorry to miss you on the road yesterday; in fact, we parked the caravan
ready for you a few miles short of Warwick and had drinks waiting for you. Then we
realized that you might have come back from Henley via Stratford on Avon. We were
so assured of seeing you that I did not leave you a note to say thank you so much for all
you did for us and all the help you gave to make it a successful week . . . [He then
summarizes results of his experiments for the benefit of Christopher, inadvertently
retaining keys to the chalet.] What a time I had shutting down camp. I must have made
quite a dozen journeys to the bottom of the valley to collect equipment but we arrived
here on time (3.30) and had everything thoroughly under control by 6 o’clock . . . (KA,
Box 12, Cadbury, J.C., letter to Honor and Christopher Cadbury (6 July 1953))
The letter specifically implies that the Cadburys did not assist in taking down the equipment,
and thus the “help” referred to was either in the original setup or in the conduct of the
experiment.25
Hooper also draws great attention to the fact that the recapture rates rose in the
predicted manner they should have on 1 July 1953, the day Ford wrote Kettlewell the
following letter:
Dear Bernard, I am glad to hear you have so satisfactory a place in which to work. It is
disappointing that the recoveries are not better and curious that you are getting 10% of
typical betularia. However, I do not doubt that the results will be very worthwhile . . .
(KA Box 17, E.B. Ford, letter from Ford (1 July 1953))
Hooper interprets the letter as follows:
We don’t know exactly what state Bernard was in, but we can deduce something of it
from a letter dated 1 July from Henry, who wrote: “It is disappointing that the
recoveries are not better . . . However, I do not doubt that the results will be very well
worth while . . .” The message sounds benign enough, but knowing Henry, Bernard
might have decoded it to mean: “Now I do hope you will get hold of yourself and
deliver up some decent numbers.” At the best of times, Bernard was an excitable man,
with moods prone to roller coaster from giddy highs to Stygian lows. He now felt that
his fate as a scientist was hanging on this experiment. The stresses of lumbago and the
difficult fieldwork, not to mention the pervasive pressures of Oxford, would not have
brightened his outlook. (pp. 114–15)
There are at least three problems associated with Hooper’s interpretation. First, there is no
reason to assume that Ford’s letter should not be taken at face value as simply intended to
console a relatively new researcher during a difficult field investigation (Coyne, 2002: 19).
Second, the timing does not support Hooper’s interpretation: she alleges that the rise in
recapture rates was a result of Kettlewell receiving a letter on the same day Ford wrote it.
Unless one presumes Kettlewell threw out data he collected on 1 July and created new data
in response to Ford’s message after receiving the letter, this seems completely implausible.
Third, it is possible to gather insights into “Bernard’s state” by examining letters he wrote
on the day in question (30 June). In three different letters he wrote to Leslie Farrer-Brown,
B.P. Uvarov and Col. Bowater on 30 June he describes the results of his experiments as
“most interesting” or “very interesting.”26 These are hardly the descriptions one would
expect of someone so discouraged by his results that he would consider committing fraud.
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Beyond all this, the “discrepancy” Hooper draws attention to, namely the fact that the
recapture rate rose from 14 percent on 29 June to 22 percent on 1 July, does not constitute
a dramatic rise in recapture rates by any stretch of the imagination. Anyone familiar with
fieldwork knows that field data are highly variable, and that the sort of variation one finds in
the results reported in Kettlewell’s papers is entirely normal. More to the point, this
variation is entirely explicable when one considers that the efficiency of the assembling traps
changes with the age of the virgin females being used, and that the numbers of moths
Kettlewell marked and released into the wild increased substantially as fresh moths emerged
from his breeding stocks.27
As a fourth line of argument, Hooper draws attention to how nicely Kettlewell’s results
fitted with his prediction (p. 256). She points out that one reason why R.A. Fisher came to
doubt the results of Gregor Mendel’s pea plant breeding experiments is that they fit too
closely with the predictions of Mendel’s theory (pp. 235–6). In other words, all other things
being equal, if the match between theory and experiment is too neat, this is reason to suspect
that the results have been doctored to make them fit. The manifest problem with this line of
reasoning when it comes to Kettlewell’s original Birmingham experiment is that the
available evidence strongly suggests that he expected the recapture rates to be much lower
than they actually turned out to be. In a letter to J.B.S. Haldane, he writes:
We have found your paper on the selective advantage of betularia ab. doubledayaria in
the Transactions as you said we should, but why in the index of the Proceedings for this
year it says “Trans: see Proceedings” I know not. You calculated a 30% selective
advantage on the original Manchester melanic. Both in the Isle of Wight and Ireland
odd specimens of doubledayaria have turned up this year for the first time and it should
be interesting to see if the rate of spread follows the original example. Your figure of
30% selective advantage has given me great encouragement as it should be possible to
show this with much fewer individuals in “mark and release” experiments on both
phenotypes than I had thought would be necessary. (KA, Box 18, Haldane, J.B.S., letter
to Haldane (16 September 1952))
In the days and months since Kettlewell wrote this letter, he also repeatedly drew attention
to the fact that he was concerned that the numbers of moths he planned to use would be
insufficient, because he strongly suspected that for a number of practical reasons (e.g.
migration from the test site) his recapture rates would be quite low.28 If Kettlewell were
going to commit fraud, surely he would have created figures that were more in accord with
his antecedent expectations. Indeed, it would have been particularly prudent on his part to
have invented figures that were lower than Haldane’s prediction, both to avoid the
suggestion he had committed fraud and against the possibility someone might check up on
him by repeating the experiment. But, as we all know, the recapture rate Kettlewell recorded
as a result of his 1953 experiment was a selective advantage of 50 percent, not 30 percent.
Likewise, when it came to his later 1955 experiment in the Dorset wood, he expected the
results to be a mirror image. Yet, in fact, the recapture rates were significantly higher and the
advantage for the pale form in this habitat was higher than that for the black form in the
polluted wood.
A final consideration Hooper raises against Kettlewell (and research in field settings
more in general) is the fact that he “tinkered” with the results of his investigations until he
got the results he wanted, which she regards as fraudulent.29 One can certainly agree with
Hooper that if Kettlewell haphazardly altered variables until he got the results he wanted and
Rudge: Did Kettlewell commit fraud? 261
disregarded the results of previous unsuccessful trials, this would be an example of fraud.
But this is an altogether unfair characterization of Kettlewell’s conduct, and completely
ignores several logistic problems that arise in the context of fieldwork, particularly when one
is conducting an investigation for the first time.30
It is all too easy to forget that, in 1953, Kettlewell had never conducted an investigation
like this before, and as such, like any new researcher, encountered problems that he had not
anticipated, such as how precisely to release the moths in a manner that would encourage
them to take up their natural resting positions. This is precisely the sort of detail that one
learns by trial and error. Kettlewell also encountered problems that were a logical
consequence of a tension between minimizing the artificiality of the testing conditions and
ensuring that the results of his investigation would be measurable within the limited amount
of time available. For example, Kettlewell knew from the start that the density of moths he
was using would be in excess of what one encounters in nature, but he also knew that below
a certain threshold, the results would not be statistically significant (Rudge, 1999). The
“tinkering” Kettlewell did in the field was not haphazard. He had every reason to believe
that his failure to obtain the predicted result was an artifact of his procedures, a consequence
of unintended sources of error. The changes he introduced were not motivated simply by a
desire to get the predicted result—each was justified as the elimination of potential sources
of error. This is not a fraudulent practice; the systematic elimination of such sources of error
by scientists is one important strategy by which scientists in any context ensure their results
are valid (Rudge, 1998). And, in fact, Kettlewell did not fail to report his false starts in the
two papers in question (Kettlewell, 1955b, 1956)—both papers are remarkably candid in
discussing the problems he encountered in the field and how he overcame them.
Related to her worry about the legitimacy of Kettlewell’s tinkering, Hooper openly
questions whether it is legitimate for evolutionary biologists to ignore what she regards as
potentially falsifying examples, by resorting to what she regards as a series of ad hoc claims
intended to preserve the standard account of industrial melanism at any cost (pp. 155,
292–3). This criticism completely loses sight of the fact that the standard explanation of the
phenomenon of industrial melanism we associate with Kettlewell is an idealization.
Scientists in all contexts explain departures from idealized models with reference to relevant
contingent details. This is not a matter of a scientist being dogmatic in the face of
overwhelming evidence to the contrary, any more than when a physicist accounts for
deviations from Newton’s laws of motion with reference to the effects of friction. The fact
that there are no frictionless surfaces does not lead physicists to abandon Newton’s laws as
useful approximations.
This consideration is particularly important in the context of historical sciences such as
evolutionary biology. Biological phenomena are historical entities and, consequently, the
applicability of a particular model for any specific population depends upon a host of
contingent circumstances.31 This does not imply that “anything goes” in biology—scientists
must establish that reference to the details in question is indeed warranted. Thus, in the case
of Ford and Kettlewell’s explanation of the phenomenon of industrial melanism, scientists
explain deviations from what is expected based on the model with reference to the resting
site of moths, the genetics underlying melanism, the amount of migration that occurs, the
amount and type of predation, meteorological conditions, and the presence, type and amount
of pollution. When we recognize that even in the case of a single species, such as the
peppered moth, the circumstances of each component population are unique, we should not
be surprised that the precise applicability of the model and what details must be referred to
in order to account for the dynamics of that population are subject to change.32
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Summary and conclusions
Did Kettlewell commit fraud? While we can never know for certain, the foregoing
demonstrates that Hooper (2002) does not provide one shred of evidence to support this
serious allegation. In retrospect, the multiple historiographic problems of Hooper’s approach
to this episode seem obvious. She decided in advance that she wanted to tell an
entomological “whodunnit” story regardless of whether fraud had actually been committed
(Coyne, 2002). Her research consisted of a careful search through archives and published
documents to exhaustively list questionable assumptions, methodological errors and inter-
pretive problems associated with Kettlewell’s investigations, in order to make them appear
suspect (pp. xviii–xix, 216–18, 259–71). The fact that the authors of these critical
publications have their own agenda, or even recognition that to get published, a premium is
placed upon how new results represent an advance on previous work (which tends to
emphasize a few points of difference, while minimizing broad areas of agreement) seems
never to have occurred to her. She steadfastly refused to consider the possibility that these
discrepancies might be innocent, explicable by reasons she ignores, or perhaps indicative of
an active area of science where knowledge is tentative. In lieu of any direct evidence, she
draws attention to how the possibility that Kettlewell committed fraud, and that his
colleagues at Oxford may have engaged in a conspiracy to hide the truth, might account for
these discrepancies. She repeatedly cites quotations from letters and published documents
that, out of context, might be interpreted as supporting the conspiracy theory. In the multiple
instances where the evidence directly contradicts the conspiracy theory, she either ignores
the evidence, or suggests the author was insincere and had ulterior motives for lying.
Beyond all this, as noted above, the interpretive framework she provides rests on several
fundamental misunderstandings about the nature of science.
This being said, there are several general conclusions about how science should be
depicted to the public that follow from this analysis.
First, textbook accounts and popularizations, by virtue of space constraints and their
intended audiences, cannot be expected to present the full breadth and variation of science in
all its gory detail. Textbook accounts written for children—by their nature—suggest that
scientific conclusions are known with much more certitude than is indeed the case. Thus, it
should not come as a surprise that textbook accounts differ from journal articles written for
professional scientists on subjects of active research. Conspiracy theories are entirely
unnecessary to account for these discrepancies.
Second, investigations by past scientists must be judged with reference to the prevailing
standards of the time they were conducted, in their own social and cultural contexts. It is
trivially true that after a period of 50 years, a pioneering investigation like Kettlewell’s will
fall short of contemporary standards. No scientist should be put in the position of defending
him/herself for not being aware of future standards, nor should they be criticized for making
what at the time seemed reasonable assumptions, which subsequent work has shown to be
partly or completely false. Being wrong does not make one a bad scientist.
Third, continuing to believe in a theory despite multiple outstanding problems does not
imply that a scientist is being dogmatic or irrational. These problems always have to be
balanced against the evidence in favor of the theory, and, in particular, whether there is a
more plausible alternative available. Outstanding problems and ongoing attempts to refine a
theory to account for these discrepancies, far from being signs of dogmatism, are instead
indicative of an active area of research.
Fourth and finally, none of these conclusions is specific to the Kettlewell episode. There
is a story behind every fact in science. Our record of past investigations is always
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incomplete, both because some details were never recorded and because sometimes records
are lost. In the presence of numerous gaps, it is too easy to attribute discrepancies to fraud
and conspiracy. No episode in the history of science would survive the sort of analysis
Hooper applies to Kettlewell’s research. This is not because the history of science is fraught
with fraud, but rather because Hooper’s subjective analysis places the burden of proof on the
scientist to prove he/she was innocent. As has been shown above, with a sufficiently creative
interpretation of evidence, almost anything that might be used to defend Kettlewell against
these baseless charges can be dismissed as insincere.
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Notes
1 Quotations and page references are from Hooper (2002) unless otherwise indicated. In the text and notes that
follow, manuscripts and correspondence from archives are referred to by the following convention: FA (The
E.B. Ford Archive, Oxford University), KA (The H.B.D. Kettlewell Archive, Oxford University) and SA (The
Philip M. Sheppard Archive, American Philosophical Society Library). Following the name of the archive, the
note subsequently identifies the Box, Folder, and Item consulted. Correspondence is between the scientist
whose papers have been placed in the archive and the person whose name is used to identify the box/folder,
unless otherwise indicated.
2 “Scientists are extremely reluctant to accuse other scientists of ‘fudging,’ the highest crime in science. . .”
(Hooper, 2002: 236).
3 Hooper’s tacit comparison of her analysis of fraud in the case of Kettlewell’s work on the peppered moth with
that of Karl Sabbagh’s careful examination of charges of fraud surrounding J.W. Heslop-Harrison’s botanical
work on the Isle of Rhum [Rum] is unintentionally quite revealing. Sabbagh’s analysis stems from charges
made by contemporary scientists of Heslop-Harrison and follows the trail of evidence that led John Raven to
ultimately conclude that many of the plants Heslop-Harrison claimed to have discovered on the Isle of Rhum
were introduced either by Heslop-Harrison or by his students. Sabbagh goes out of his way to consider
alternative explanations that might account for the discrepancies Raven found. Hooper’s analysis does not stem
from concerns previously raised by scientists, nor (as discussed below) is her treatment of the evidence she
uncovers without apparent bias.
4 Similar passages in other parts of the book referring to Kettlewell’s background choice experiments and his
investigations of the build-up of dominance also imply that Kettlewell committed fraud (see Hooper, 2002: 255,
296).
5 Cain (1988) disputes that such a school ever existed. However, it is important to recognize that Turner used the
appellation “school” to refer to an invisible college, i.e., a group of individuals with a shared set of related
scientific problems and methodologies who consulted with one another on a regular basis (Turner, 1988).
264 Public Understanding of Science 14 (3)
6 For instance, most of the first chapter is devoted to emphasizing how odd and eccentric entomologists,
particularly lepidopterists are (as if similar eccentricities are not part of the culture of any group of professionals
or hobbyists). While ostensibly used to romanticize bug hunting and the fervor with which amateurs pursue
their hobby, the undertext of this chapter is clear, namely establishing that entomologists are very odd people—
single-minded individuals who would resort to almost anything to obtain rare specimens and to achieve
recognition for their findings. As naturalists, Kettlewell and Ford are objects of suspicion right from the start.
7 KA, Box 14, Cockayne, E.A., letter from Cockayne (28 May 1946). The letter indicates that Cockayne declined
the invitation.
8 R.J. Berry disputes Hooper’s interpretation of his remark:
I don’t know whether I have regrets about describing Kettlewell as one of the worst professional scientists
I have known. It is true, but it carries the implication that his work was therefore poor, which is not true.
Kettlewell was an exemplar of someone who could translate natural history observations into hard data for
scientific analysis. Niko Tinbergen and Miriam Rothschild were others of the same ilk. I regard this as a
greater talent than that possessed by many run-of-the-mill academics who argue along drearily rational
and predictable tramlines. The fact that Kettlewell was not a paragon of every single intellectual virtue
ought not to be allowed to belittle his particular talents and skills, which were great. Linking natural
history to mainstream science is much more a British than an American tradition. (R.J. Berry’s letter to
D.W. Rudge, 29 December 2003)
9 “Bernard was not capable of acting in any way but a gentleman. He made mistakes (don’t we all!) but he would
agree with me [that] ‘The man who never made mistakes never made anything!’ . . . I never knew him to shrink
from confessing his errors and he welcomed criticism as a contribution to further thought and work” (message
from Eric Classey to D.W. Rudge, 24 January 2004). E.P. Wiltshire, another associate of Kettlewell agrees:
“Whatever happened to Bernard K at the end of his life, he certainly was admired in the fifties and no one then
would [have] believe[d] he could be a ‘fraud’ or a ‘fiddler’” (E.P. Wiltshire’s letter to D.W. Rudge, 23
December 2003).
10 While the work of two of Kettlewell’s colleagues, A.J. Cain and Philip Sheppard, on snail shell banding
patterns in Cepaea nemoralis did figure prominently in debates about drift, it was because their study was seen
as a convincing refutation of Maxime Lamotte’s previous study that suggested that snail banding patterns might
be due to drift (Clarke, 2003).
11 FA, Box A, Folder 10, “The Experimental Work of E. B. Ford”—his answers to a suggested final examination
inviting students to assess his contribution to genetics.
12 The work of Cyril Clarke (also a medical doctor by training) and Philip Sheppard likewise attracted funding by
establishing the medical significance of their work.
13 Charles Elton, another luminary of ecology and a contemporary of Kettlewell at Oxford also had no advanced
degree.
14 KA, Box 1, Professional Career, Brasenose College. Papers in this file suggest he had an informal association
with the college as early as 30 May 1955.
15 KA, Box 1, Nuffield Foundation, Report of work Kettlewell commenced in September 1951.
16 KA, Box 27, Uvarov, B.P., letter from Uvarov (6 October 1952).
17 The author gratefully acknowledges Ms. Louise Jarvis’ assistance in locating this article.
18
I have just received your letter of February 3rd, in which you are good enough to offer me a post in your
Genetic Laboratories as a Research Worker, commencing May 1st 1954 and terminating September 1956.
It is with the greatest regret (how great I am sure you will realise) that I shall be unable to accept it. The
sole reason for this is, of course, that I am advised by my Chartered Accountants that if I visit England
again in the near future, I may be taxed in retrospect for previous years . . . It is all the more annoying to
me that this offer comes at a time when, after five months of work out here applying the technique of
radio-active labelling of Locusts – (the same technique I was developing at Oxford with Panaxia
dominula) – it is becoming increasingly obvious that it is virtually impossible to conduct this work so far
away from the source of origin of the isotopes. I shall be prepared to hand over my Laboratory notes and
details of all field work up to date on the following: Air pollution figures for 1952–53 . . . Figures for
viability differences for larvae of Biston betularia . . . Gene frequency figures for Biston betularia . . . 
(KA, Box 7, Travel £4 South Africa letter to E.B. Ford, dated 13 February 1954)
19 SA, Series III Box 1: [Biston betularia], notes re. recapture figures from 1959–64.
20
In the aviary Bernard had fiddled with his experiment, laying out, after two unpromising starts, a
smorgasbord of bugs to get the results he wanted. It would have been natural for him to try to fix what
wasn’t working, just as he would have tinkered with a sputtering generator or changed the position of a
cage in which two moths refused to mate. Is it possible that he made modifications to his experimental
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design in Beacon Wood? Working solo, Bernard made all the decisions about how many moths to place
on each tree trunk, where to place the carbonaria and typicals, how far apart to space the moths. He alone
rated the crypsis of each moth against its background and identified his catches by phenotype. (p. 118, see
also pp. 112–13)
21 As one scientist who reviewed Hooper’s book has pointed out, there are multiple reasons that might account for
this apparent discrepancy, not one of which supports her contention that fraud has occurred (Coyne, 2002: 19).
It is particularly significant that neither Kroodsma nor Sargent is identified as agreeing with Hooper’s
interpretation that this discrepancy constitutes fraud. In fact, Sargent is quoted as specifically denying Hooper’s
interpretation (p. 255).
22
Another mystery concerns who was with Bernard in the woods. He uses the pronoun “we” in his papers,
but this may have been just a scientific convention, because otherwise, in his letter and reminiscences,
there is no trace of anyone else – except Hazel . . . [who] “observed a bird fly out of the bracken, snatch
a betularia, and return it to the ground, the whole thing being over in a flash.” No one had yet seen a bird
in the wild eating a peppered moth off a tree trunk. Without this observation, any number of other things
could have been happening to the moths, including being eaten by something else. Thus, this hedge
sparrow was heaven-sent, and Bernard reported that he and Hazel were able to “watch this bird regularly
at work and to score the order in which it took its phenotypes.” (p. 118)
23 See KA, Box 8, Allan, P.B.M., letter to Allan (16 March 1955); KA, Box 15, Demuth, R.P., letter to Demuth
(21 March 1955).
24 For example, KA, Box 2, Research & Equipment £2, letter and attachment to Dr. Hinde (8 August 1953).
25 A letter written much later also strongly suggests their son James assisted Kettlewell in the conduct of his 1955
investigations, prior to his doctoral work with Kettlewell: 
Having just been given a grant from the D.S.I.R. for an assistant for three years, I am wondering whether
he [James Cadbury] would be suitable . . . I met James Cadbury a few years ago and he actually helped
me for a short time with mark-release experiments I was doing, and as I am looking for someone who is
more of a “naturalist” than a first class Honours, possibly overspecialized, Biologist, I wondered if he
would do. (KA, Box 12, Cadbury, C.J., letter to Sir James Grey (Department of Zoology, Cambridge) (9
May 1959))
26 KA, Box 10, Bowater, Col. W., letter to Bowater (30 June 1953); KA, Box 27, Uvarov, B.P., letter to Uvarov
(30 June 1953); KA, Box 1, Nuffield Foundation letter to Farrer-Brown (30 June 1953).
27 The author thanks Dr. Ian Musgrave and Dr. Bruce Grant for their insights on the causes of variability of field
data. See also Young and Musgrave (2005).
28
. . . My original plan was to do my release experiments somewhere in Devon or Cornwall. You may
realize that betularia is not an ideal insect for release experiments because in the first place one loses 50%
(or thereabouts) because practically none of the females come to light and secondly because the males
obviously fly from big distances. It is therefore essential to me to find a releasing place giving optimum
conditions for return, hence my thought of a circumscribed wood in Devon or Cornwall . . . (KA, Box 23,
Philpott, V.W., letter to Philpott, 14 May 1953) 
and “. . . I have had a most interesting time in the Midlands doing a population study of betularia with
marked releases and I think I can say it has been very successful, as strangely I got large numbers back,
which is contrary to what I have been told would happen . . .” (KA, Box 21, Lees, F.H., letter to Lees, 6
July 1953).
29 See note 20 above. Similar comments are made regarding his mark–recapture experiments on pp. 134–6,
254–5.
30 “Apparently she [Hooper] does not recognize that it is reasonable to discover the conditions that favour the
phenomenon you want to study” (Clarke, 2003).
31 This is analogous to how researchers explain other historical events, such as individual plane crashes. A general
model of what causes plane crashes may lead investigators to consider the possibility that the crash is due to a
design flaw or to pilot error. Evidence that rules out one of these factors does not constitute evidence against the
model as a whole.
32 Hooper’s concern about the standard account being immune to falsification also ignores the fact that, in
Kettlewell’s famous predation experiments, there was a null hypothesis at stake that was indeed falsified,
namely the hypothesis that the recapture rates would be the same (Rudge, 2001).
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